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The aim of this study was to initiate the exploration of debiasing methods applicable
in real-life settings for achieving lasting improvement in decision making competence
regarding multiple decision biases. Here, we tested the potentials of the analogical
encoding method for decision debiasing. The advantage of this method is that it can
foster the transfer from learning abstract principles to improving behavioral performance.
For the purpose of the study, we devised an analogical debiasing technique for 10 biases
(covariation detection, insensitivity to sample size, base rate neglect, regression to the
mean, outcome bias, sunk cost fallacy, framing effect, anchoring bias, overconfidence
bias, planning fallacy) and assessed the susceptibility of the participants (N = 154) to
these biases before and 4 weeks after the training. We also compared the effect of the
analogical training to the effect of ‘awareness training’ and a ‘no-training’ control group.
Results suggested improved performance of the analogical training group only on tasks
where the violations of statistical principles are measured. The interpretation of these
findings require further investigation, yet it is possible that analogical training may be the
most effective in the case of learning abstract concepts, such as statistical principles,
which are otherwise difficult to master. The study encourages a systematic research
of debiasing trainings and the development of intervention assessment methods to
measure the endurance of behavior change in decision debiasing.
Keywords: judgment and decision making, heuristics and biases, debiasing, analogical training, intervention
assessments
Introduction
The early observations of a normative-descriptive gap in human judgment and decision making
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) has given rise to a proliﬁc research ﬁeld with the central aim of
describing how andwhy human reasoning falls short of logical, economical, or statistical normative
ideals. Studied mostly in laboratory situations, people tend to show systematic biases in judgment
and decision making tasks (Gilovich et al., 2002). Although the interpretation of these results are
not without debate (e.g., Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Klein, 1999), a persistent assumption is that
people either miss the adequate background knowledge for certain decision problems (Perkins
et al., 1993), or they prefer to rely on simple heuristics and strategies that require low cognitive
eﬀort, but potentially lead to suboptimal decisions (Kahneman, 2011).
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Although these biases and fallacies can impact people’s life
to a great degree (Parker and Fischhoﬀ, 2005; Lunn, 2013),
our understanding of how to improve human decision making
is far from advanced. One factor that might have curbed the
enthusiasm of researchers in this area is that the initial debiasing
studies showed pessimistic results (Fischhoﬀ, 1981), suggesting
a robustness of human decision biases. Nevertheless, one can
be hopeful about debiasing if considering that general aptitude
correlates positively with normative responses (Larrick et al.,
1993; Stanovich and West, 1998), or that studying statistics or
economics makes one less likely to succumb to decision biases
(Lehman and Nisbett, 1990; Fennema and Perkins, 2008).
General Debiasing Strategies
In the debiasing research, the identiﬁcation of the intervention
methods mostly follows speculations. An obvious speculation
for improving decision making could be that experience would
ultimately teach people how to avoid bad decisions, so increasing
the amount of experience within a domain should improve
the quality of the individual’s decisions (Kagel and Levin,
1986). As intuitive as it sounds, there are several reasons
why experience itself will not necessarily debias judgments and
decisions. Firstly, people often use feedback only from a subset
of events due to unreliable learning environments (Hogarth,
2001) or they themselves bias the encoding and recall of the
feedback due to self-serving attributions (Mezulis et al., 2004).
The received feedback is often delayed and it is diﬃcult to
identify the determinants of the successes and errors (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1986). Secondly, people tend to evaluate decisions
not by how they were made, but only by their outcomes,
which can be misleading in uncertain environments (Baron and
Hershey, 1988).
Another common assumption is that improving people’s
knowledge about normative rules, such as statistical principles,
will have a general eﬀect on the quality of their decisions. To
test this, Nisbett et al. (1983) and Fong et al. (1986) initiated an
extensive research program and found that by the use of speciﬁc
cognitive factors, the learning and use of statistical rules may be
facilitated within a domain type. However, the transfer of this
learning to new domains is rather elusive (Fong and Nisbett,
1991). Critical thinking is also generally assumed to be a potential
means to overcome cognitive biases (Baron, 2000). In fact, the
aim of critical thinking tests is mostly to assess the person’s
ability to avoid biased and erroneous reasoning (Ennis, 1991).
Teaching critical thinking, however, is not just a challenging task
(Willingham, 2008), but the magnitude of its average eﬀect is
surprisingly small (Niu et al., 2013).
A similar meta-strategy for debiasing is the generation of bias
awareness (Fischhoﬀ, 1981). The argument of this approach is
that knowing about the existence of the bias should reduce its
eﬀect (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). It was found, however,
that knowing about the bias alone is not suﬃcient; understanding
the underlying decision mechanisms has a more direct debiasing
eﬀect (Mowen and Gaeth, 1992). Still, general knowledge about
the biases without adequate coping skills may fall short of
applicability, as was shown in several early debiasing studies
(Slovic et al., 1980).
Specific Debiasing Strategies
Most of the debiasing research has been dedicated to developing
and evaluating speciﬁc strategies addressing individual biases,
such as overconﬁdence (Renner and Renner, 2001) or sunk
cost (Soman, 2001), using a great variety of methods (for a
discussion see Mellers and Locke, 2007). As a result, the ﬁeld of
debiasing research became highly fragmented. Arkes (1991) tried
to categorize the debiasing methods into three broad categories
of biases: strategy-based errors, association-based errors, and
psychophysically based errors. He argues that a few general
causes are responsible for these biases, and for this reason, they
require similar remedies. Strategy-based errors, in which people
use inferior strategies, should be decreased by increasing the
accountability of the decision maker. Association-based errors,
where the initial answer is misleading, should be lowered by
instructions. Finally, the psychophysically based errors, such as
contrast eﬀect, are to be decreased by altering reference points
or reframing the problem. This categorization relies on the
assumption that the wide range of biases is the product of a
few well-deﬁnable underlying factors. Since the work of Arkes
(1991), the empirical ﬁndings depict a more complex portrait of
the taxonomy of decision biases. It is not just that an individual
bias can result as an interplay of diﬀerent cognitive factors (e.g.,
conﬁrmation bias; Nickerson, 1998), but also, biases previously
believed to be unitary (such as the framing or anchoring eﬀect)
turned out to be labels for diﬀerent and dissociating eﬀects (Levin
et al., 1998; Epley and Gilovich, 2001).
Technological Strategies
The diverse collection of debiasing techniques can be also
categorized by their nature. Larrick (2004) suggested grouping
these techniques by their technological, motivational, and
cognitive aspects. Technological strategies such as using
quantitative models (e.g., Dawes and Corrigan, 1974) or
checklists (e.g., Hales and Pronovost, 2006) have repeatedly been
demonstrated to amend human fallibility. The introduction of
these technological solutions is not in the focus of the present
paper; however, it is worth mentioning that recent years have
witnessed a boom in this area of debiasing. Firstly, clever tricks
have been invented to improve the accuracy of our judgments.
For example, Herzog and Hertwig (2009) suggest that when
we have to guess about something measurable (e.g., the age of
someone) we should assume that our ﬁrst guess is wrong and we
should guess again. By this dialectic bootstrapping we ‘bracket
the truth’ and the average of the two guesses is more likely to be
closer to the truth than either of the guesses. Also, asking a few
people seems to be enough to use the wisdom of crowd to improve
the accuracy of our estimate (Larrick et al., 2012). A very diﬀerent
recent approach for dealing with biased decisions is to accept
that people are imperfect with their decisions and, instead, we
should modify their environment to reduce the chance of errors.
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) describe a list of “choice architecture”
methods (e.g., social norms, salience, commitment) that can
nudge people’s decisions in a wiser direction. The advantage of
this Nudge approach is that it doesn’t rely on the improvement
of the people and it has been shown to be a low cost intervention
in areas from improving health behavior (e.g., Marteau et al.,
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2011) to increasing tax compliance (e.g., Castro and Scartascini,
2013).
Motivational Strategies
Larrick (2004) suggest that improving the motivation of people
represents a separate category of the debiasing techniques. One
apparent way to motivate people to perform better is to increase
their incentives. Experimental economics relies strongly on the
assumption that increased monetary reward induces the subjects
to expend more cognitive eﬀort on reﬂection and calculation,
which should ultimately lead to the reduction of errors in
performance (Smith and Walker, 1993). A prerequisite for this
assumption is that the individual must possess the necessary
skills or strategies and only the lack of eﬀort is responsible
for their under-performance. In their extensive review, Camerer
and Hogarth (1999) found little evidence that people act more
rationally at high stakes than at low stakes. Incentives have been
found to be eﬀective mostly at tasks where people generally
possess the cognitive capital that the work requires (such as
clerical work). Decision making tasks, however, are often quite
complex or they require the decision maker to recognize when
to apply them. In fact, increasing the incentives can also lead to
a decrease in performance by applying the wrong strategy with
more determination (Hogarth et al., 1991). Although increasing
incentives does not serve as a general recipe to improve decisions,
they seem to work in certain cases (e.g., Epley, 2004) or they can
simply motivate people to learn about more speciﬁc debiasing
techniques (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).
People can be motivated to improve their decisions not just
by external incentives, but also by social beneﬁts. For example,
holding people accountable for their decisions was found to be
an eﬀective motivator to decrease certain decision biases (Lerner
and Tetlock, 1999). Making favorable impressions or avoiding
embarrassment seem to serve as strong social beneﬁts and induce
people to use pre-emptive self-criticism before making decisions
(Larrick, 2004). A danger in the indiscriminate application of this
technique is that it can motivate the decision maker to construct
justiﬁcation for the decision rather than improving the decision
process (Shaﬁr and LeBoeuf, 2004).
Cognitive Strategies
A third category of debiasing techniques in Larrick’s (2004)
system is the various cognitive strategies that serve to
change the decision maker’s perception and approach of the
diﬀerent decision problems. Based on the review of 62 articles
investigating 72 diﬀerent debiasing methods, Kaufmann et al.
(2010) further categorized these cognitive strategies by their
main focus, which can be on (1) structure, (2) perspective or
(3) outcome. Many studies have found that decomposing and
restructuring the decision-related information have a beneﬁcial
inﬂuence on the accuracy and correctness of decisions (e.g.,
Coupey, 1994; Ashton and Kennedy, 2002). The aim of the
‘perspective focus’ strategies are to change the person’s self-
centered perspective for the perspective of an outsider or another
involved party. This tactic can reduce misprediction about others’
behavior (Faro and Rottenstreich, 2006), which can be especially
beneﬁcial in negotiation (Bazerman and Neale, 1982). Taking
an outsider’s perspective appears to be especially practical in
real-life since the ﬁndings show that people tend to avoid the
planning fallacy more when they estimate others’ completion
time (Buehler et al., 1994). Drawing attention to alternative
outcomes has also been found to be a useful tool to reduce
the eﬀect of several biases (e.g., Lowe and Reckers, 1994). This
technique can eﬀectively counteract people’s tendency to consider
only supportive evidence for their hypothesis (Nickerson, 1998).
“Consider the opposite” is a similar tactic by asking ourselves
how would we know if we were wrong before making our
judgments (Gilovich, 1991). This method was found to eﬀectively
reduce biases such as overconﬁdence (Arkes, 1991) or anchoring
(Mussweiler et al., 2000). Nevertheless, it can backﬁre if toomuch
listed counterevidence can similarly bias the decision (Roese,
2004).
The Challenge of Transfer
From what we have learned about decision debiasing it seems
that it is not enough to educate people about the existence
of biases and their functionality; they also need to acquire
speciﬁc debiasing strategies to cope with these challenges. What
makes debiasing even more diﬃcult is that decision makers
have to recognize the situations in which they need to use the
strategies they learned. This task requires transfer from the rule
they learned during the training event to the test situation or
(preferably) to any analogous real-life situation. The question is
how to train people on an abstract rule that they would apply in
various relevant situations.
In studies of reasoning, some evidence indicates that
practicing only abstract rules can improve performance on
speciﬁc problems. For example, Fong et al. (1986) found that
after training on the law of large numbers where the participants
were taught about statistical notions such as sample, population
and variability, they were better at reasoning about various
uncertainty-related problems, such as slot machines, lotteries,
or athletic performance. Similarly, undergraduate and graduate
training in psychology and social sciences (Lehman et al., 1988;
Lehman and Nisbett, 1990) has been found to increase the
students’ ability in reasoning about everyday problems involving
uncertainty. Nevertheless, it is hard to assume that these people
relied only on their abstract knowledge for the new cases and did
not beneﬁt from the concrete examples (e.g., the urn problem
demonstrations in the study of Fong et al., 1986) use during
the training. Closer examination of these results suggests that
it is easier to apply the abstract rules in cases with matching
superﬁcial features. For example, Cheng et al. (1986) showed
that abstract training of the obligation rule (“If precondition P
is satisﬁed, action A must be taken”) improves performance on
Wason’s (1966) four-card problem, but only on those versions
of the task where the obligation rule could be used in the task.
Fong and Nisbett (1991) taught their participants about the law
of large numbers in either one of two domains and they were
tested on both domains. Although immediately after the training,
they found no eﬀect of domain, 2 weeks later the participants
could perform better in the domain they were taught in. In
their summary, Smith et al. (1992) suggest that in situations
where more than one mechanism is involved, reasoning might
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rely on hybrid instance-rule mechanisms. Therefore, superﬁcial
similarity between the learned instance and the target case can
facilitate rule-application. This suggestion is in accord with
studies of problem solving where it is assumed that a major cause
of failures to transfer the relevant rule to analogous situations
is the greater attention people pay to the salient and superﬁcial
details at the time of learning and that they will apply the
learned principles in the test situation to the degree that it
shares those contextual features (Holyoak and Koh, 1987; Ross,
1987).
Thompson et al. (2000) and Gentner et al. (2003) introduced
a method to foster this analogical transfer. The idea behind the
method is that people can better encode the principles if they
discover them themselves. They suggest that schema abstraction
can be promoted by asking people to ﬁnd similarities in
superﬁcially diﬀerent cases. According to the structure-mapping
theory (Gentner, 1983), making comparisons should highlight
the structural similarities between examples with diﬀerent surface
features. This discovered common relation can be better encoded
and retrieved in the future. A further advantage of this practice
is that it also helps the learner identify the relevant aspects
of the examples. This analogical encoding method was tested
primarily in negotiation skill training. Thompson et al. (2000),
for example, found that when management students learned
about bargaining principles through comparisons they were
nearly three times more likely to transfer the principles to actual
bargaining situations than those who only read the cases. Beside
several negotiation studies (Loewenstein et al., 2003; Gentner
et al., 2004; Moran et al., 2004) analogical encoding was also
found to help the debiasing of the robust Acquiring Company
Problem (Idson et al., 2004). In this task (for detailed description
see Samuelson and Bazerman, 1985), the decision maker has to
decide what price an acquirer company should oﬀer for a target
company if the acquirer knows that it will be worth 50% more
in their possession, although only the target company knows
the current worth exactly. It is a general ﬁnding that fewer
than 10% of the participants realize that the best choice is $0
(Bazerman, 2005). A protocol analysis conducted on this task
(Tor and Bazerman, 2003) showed that the main reason why
people fail this task is that they ignore the rules of the game, that
the target company has unique information as well as they ignore
the decisions of the other parties. Idson et al. (2004) managed to
improve performance on this task by requiring the participants
to understand the diﬀerences between two diﬀerent tasks prior
solving the Acquiring Company Problem. The Monty Hall Game
(Nalebuﬀ, 1987) and the Multiparty Ultimatum Game (Messick
et al., 1997) tasks are seemingly unrelated, yet discovering their
structural diﬀerences can train the participants to focus on
the key features necessary to solve the Acquiring Company
Problem. Analogical processing, therefore, appears to be eﬀective
in overcoming failures in a variety of tasks. Interestingly, the
eﬀect seems to be stronger when the compared cases are more
diverse (Moran et al., 2008) and it facilitates not just transfer,
but also the retrieval of analogical matches stored in memory
(Gentner et al., 2009). These results suggest that the facilitation
of analogical processing should be further explored in improving
decision making.
The Aim of Debiasing Research
The central aim of the prescriptive approach of decision making
is to identify those tools and methods that can be applied to
improve the quality of decisions. Decision making is a central
determinant of quality of life, interpersonal relations, economics
and societal welfare. Therefore, the ﬁnal aim of decision science,
and especially the debiasing approach, should be to promote the
improvement of decision skills and rational behavior in everyday
life. Despite the high number of studies in this approach, two
important aspects have received insuﬃcient attention. Firstly,
most studies concentrate on immediate changes in decision
making and the long-term eﬀect of the training methods are
rarely assessed. For this reason, our knowledge is rather scarce
about what elements can achieve lasting change in decision
skills. Also, we do not know how to achieve acceptable cost-
beneﬁt ratio of these interventions (Arkes, 1991). Secondly,
the applied training techniques are often applicable only in
laboratory settings, and miss those motivational and interactive
features that could make them transferable to and applicable in
non-academic settings.
From this aspect, the challenge of debiasing is not just to
identify those techniques and strategies that are potentially
eﬀective in achieving lasting improvement, but also to connect
the interventions to the everyday world of the individuals. The
problem of the ﬁeld is the fundamental conﬂict of interest
between the researcher and the potential practitioner with respect
to the complexity of the training methods. From the researcher’s
perspective, the applied method should be reducible to one
controlled variable, studied in laboratory settings. The training
should focus on a single decision bias in a particular domain.
From the practitioner’s perspective, the training methods should
promise enduring improvement in various areas of decision
making. The interventions should be applicable in diﬀerent
environments and they should match the interest, motivation,
capacity and attention of the individuals.
Although it is an understandable aim of the researcher to
minimize the complexity of the experiments to sustain the
conceptual clarity of the measurements, real-life debiasing
methods also need evidence-based development. Clinical
therapies show us that intervention methods can be both broadly
applicable and empirically tested. Debiasing would greatly beneﬁt
from a similar exploration to learn what works and what does
not. Sporadic individual studies will not be enough to achieve the
societal aim of debiasing, and so we argue that for this a wider
research program is needed.
The goal of this research is to initiate the exploration of the
potential debiasing training techniques for lasting improvement
for multiple biases. In this study, we tested the duration of the
eﬀect of an analogical debiasing method. Toward this aim, we
developed an analogical training for 10 decision biases based on
the principles of the analogical transfer technique of Loewenstein
et al. (2003). The structure of this development followed Lewin’s
(1947) recommendation: Unfreezing, Change, Refreezing. The
aim of Unfreezing is to make the decision makers realize that
their current intuitive strategies are ﬂawed. For this, we asked
the participants to answer questions in an assessment test after
which the software generated a report showing which of the
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situational questions they failed. The Change phase was preceded
by analogical sensitization training where the participants learned
to recognize the structural similarities between superﬁcially
diﬀerent cases. The Change phase always started with situational
tasks or examples of people committing the given bias. Their
task was to discover the essence between or principle behind
the examples. Once they discovered the principle, the trainer
provided a description of the functionality of the bias. Then
the participants had to recall autobiographical memories about
committing the bias. Next, the trainer provided coping strategies
for similar situations and for Refreezing the participants had
to predict when they will use the newly learned strategy. Four
weeks after the training the participants were tested again with a
diﬀerent version of the survey than the one they ﬁlled out before
the training. The empirical aim of this project was to compare the
eﬀect of this analogical training to the cases where people received
only awareness training or where they did not receive training
at all.
Materials and Methods
Participants
One ﬁfty-four (118 female) Hungarian university students took
part in the experiment (M = 21.73 years, SD = 3.61) for course
credit. After obtaining informed consent they were randomly
assigned to one of the three groups: two experimental groups
(n = 50 each) and one control group (n = 54). The research was
approved by the institutional ethics committee of Eotvos Lorand
University, Hungary.
Design and Procedures
The participants of the two experimental groups took part in 3-h
long debiasing training in group sessions with 6–17 participants
in each session (a total of nine sessions were conducted in the
whole experiment). All sessions followed the same structure for
both groups with the same main phases: (1) awareness training,
(2) analogical sensitization and (3) analogical training. Table 1
gives a summary of the design of the experiment; the diﬀerent
training phases are described in more detail in the Section
“Materials.”
Although both experimental groups received debiasing
training for a total of 10 biases and fallacies, the experimental
conditions were crossed between them: while one group received
awareness training for six of the biases (Covariation detection,
Insensitivity to sample size, Base rate neglect, Regression to the
mean, Outcome bias, Sunk cost fallacy) and received analogical
training for the remaining four biases (Framing eﬀect, Anchoring
bias, Overconﬁdence bias, Planning fallacy), the other group
received them in inverse (analogical training for the same six
biases and awareness training for the remaining four). The
explanations of these biases are provided in Supplementary Table
S1. We trained Covariation detection, Insensitivity to sample
size, Regression to the mean and Base rate neglect together as
‘statistical biases’ based on the similarity of the skills needed to
overcome them (the usage of statistical rules). It is important
to emphasize that for these biases participants did not receive
TABLE 1 | Overview of the experimental design.
Group 1
(n = 50)
Group 2
(n = 50)
Control group
(n = 54)
Test (before
the training)
An online questionnaire for assessing the susceptibility
to decision biases.
Awareness
training
Training for:
- Outcome bias;
- Sunk cost fallacy;
- Base rate neglect;
- Insensitivity to
sample size;
- Regression to the
mean;
- Covariation
detection.
Training for:
- Framing effect;
- Anchoring bias;
- Overconfidence
bias;
- Planning fallacy.
No training
Analogical
sensitization
Familiarizing participants with analogical thinking.
Analogical
training
Training for:
- Framing effect;
- Anchoring bias;
- Overconfidence
bias;
- Planning fallacy.
Training for:
- Outcome bias;
- Sunk cost fallacy;
- Base rate neglect;
- Insensitivity to
sample size;
- Regression to the
mean;
- Covariation
detection.
Test (after the
training)
An online questionnaire for assessing the susceptibility
to decision biases.
training separately: the biases were presented together for both
the awareness and the analogical training groups.
To assess susceptibility to these decision biases, the
participants were required to complete an online questionnaire
1 day before the training sessions. Four weeks after the sessions,
the participants were asked to complete an altered version of the
online test within 3 days. The control group received no training;
instead, they were only required to complete the two versions of
the online questionnaire with the same time delay between the
two parts as the experimental groups.
Materials
The Online Questionnaire
The susceptibility of the participants to nine biases was assessed
on an online questionnaire (Supplementary Table S1). The
questionnaire was developed as a part of one of our previous,
unpublished studies. As the planning fallacy could not be
measured the same way as the other biases, the eﬀectiveness of
the trainings for the planning fallacy was not assessed. Each of
the other biases was measured by one task in the questionnaires.
The tasks were adapted from the heuristics and biases literature
with modiﬁcations necessary for the requirements of our study.
For each question, four possible answer options were presented
with only one being the normatively correct one. Participants
scored either 1 for correct answers or 0 for incorrect answers.
In case of Overconﬁdence, the perceived accuracy score of
the participant was subtracted from their real accuracy score.
To increase the motivation of the participants to give the
right answer, the wording of the questions was modiﬁed to
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place the participant in the role of the agent responsible
for making the best possible decision in the given critical
situation.
Two versions of the questionnaire were used: one before
the experiment and one after. Only the described decisional
situations were diﬀerent in the two versions, the underlying
structure of the tasks was retained. After solving the
questionnaires, the participants received a summary table
of their performance on each task, with a brief description of
that task. The completion of each survey took ∼25 min. Time
pressure was also applied on each question (30–60 s). In the
second survey, besides the heuristics and biases tasks, we also
asked the participants about how much they utilized the learned
techniques following the training.
The Training Sessions
The phases of the training were connected by a continuous
Power Point presentation, with a brief break after the awareness
training phase. Participants took an active role in the analogical
sensitization and analogical phases, while the awareness phase
followed a presentation. Table 2 gives a comprehensive summary
of the diﬀerent phases.
The Awareness Training
In the awareness training phase a short general introduction
of heuristics and biases was followed by the presentation of
each bias. In the introductory phase, besides giving information
about the duration and the aim of the training, to ‘unfreeze’
the participants the ﬂaws of intuitive decision making were
demonstrated by several examples, with the conclusion that in
real life our intuition can often misguide us. Participants also
received a feedback presentation on how people make mistakes
on tests similar to theirs.
The presentation of the biases consisted of three parts: a real
life example, an explanation of the bias and the techniques to
avoid the bias. Participants in this phase were only presented with
the underlying principles and real-life examples of each bias. The
diﬀerent examples and techniques for each bias are detailed in
Supplementary Table S2.
The Analogical Sensitization
In the analogical sensitization phase pattern recognition was
facilitated by two tasks. In the ﬁrst task (adapted from Gick and
Holyoak, 1980), participants were asked to pair up four short
scenarios without explicitly telling them the diﬀerence between
the concepts of structural and surface analogies. In order to
understand the diﬀerence between these two types of analogies,
this pairing task was followed by a group discussion of the
solutions. The second task was an integrative bargaining task
based on Follett’s (1940) orange-peel example. The participants
were expected to reach a trade-oﬀ in a negotiation situation, after
hearing about a solution in an analogous story. This again was
followed by a group discussion which aimed to ascertain that all
participants correctly understood the diﬀerence between the two
types of analogies.
The Analogical Training
In the analogical training phase, participants were trained on
each bias consecutively following the same structure: at ﬁrst,
groups of two or three were asked to accomplish diﬀerent tasks
with the aim of detecting structural similarities between stories
or situations containing the same bias. After discussing their
interpretation with the whole group, the participants received
the same presentation on the normative principles along with
examples of the biases, as did the other experimental group in the
awareness phase. After this, participants were asked to recollect
memories or try to imagine future occasions when they might
commit the bias in their everyday life. Following this, they were
ﬁrst asked to suggest strategies to avoid the biases, and then they
were presented with speciﬁc research-based coping techniques.
Finally, the participants had to discuss how they would utilize
these techniques in real life.
TABLE 2 | A detailed overview of the training phases.
Phase Sub phase Task Goal Duration
Awareness training Introduction No active participation Familiarizing participants with the aim and
duration of the training followed by short
presentation on intuitive decision making in
general.
∼15 min
Presentation Familiarizing participants with specific
biases using illustrative examples and
coping techniques for each bias.
∼45–60 min
Analogical sensitization Workshop Pairing different scenarios by similarity to
understand structural and surface analogies,
followed by tasks involving the recognition of
structural similarity.
Familiarizing participants with the difference
between surface and structural similarity
and practicing analogical thinking
∼10 min
Analogical training Analogical encoding Discovering and discussing structural similarity
in vignettes describing new biases.
Developing new schemas from examples
for future recognition.
∼120 min
Presentation No active participation Describing the specific biases to
participants.
Pattern recognition Construction or recall of scenarios structurally
similar to the example.
Recognizing the bias-specific patterns in
everyday life.
Action plan Participants learn bias-specific action plans that
help them avoid biased decision making.
Participants understand what to do when
they encounter the newly learned patterns.
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The examples and the avoidance techniques of the biases used
in both the awareness and analogical conditions were the same
(see Supplementary Table S2). For the description of the speciﬁc
training tasks, see Supplementary Table S3.
Results
Bias Assessments
The initial assessment of the performance on the pre-test
questionnaire showed that participants were generally susceptible
to the measured biases (Table 3). Three of the statistical biases
(covariation detection, regression to the mean, insensitivity to
sample size) showed the weakest performance, and participants
resisted the anchoring bias the most.
Statistical Analysis
Since the participants answered an online questionnaire before
and after the treatment, both within-subjects (pre- and
post-training tests) and between-subjects (awareness training,
analogical training, control) measures were collected throughout
the experiment. As the two versions of the test may not be
equally sensitive, accuracy was used as a criterion variable in
the models. To control for statistical noise (e.g., cohort-eﬀects),
hierarchical linear logistic mixed eﬀect models were used with the
lme4 (Bates et al., 2014) and nlme (Pinheiro et al., 2014) packages
in R. Fixed eﬀects were entered hierarchically to the model:
ﬁrst test-score diﬀerences (the diﬀerences between pre-training
and post-training test-scores), then experimental manipulation
(analogical, awareness or control), and ﬁnally the interaction
between them. The participants were entered as random eﬀects
to the models.
If the manipulation had an eﬀect, the inclusion of the
interaction term would signiﬁcantly improve model ﬁt. This
would mean that the observed variance in accuracy could not
only be the result of the diﬀerent sensitivity of the two tests
or of random noise, but it was aﬀected by the experimental
manipulation. To assess the order of the diﬀerences (i.e., whether
the analogical training was more eﬀective than the awareness
training), the diﬀerent conditions were compared hierarchically
stepwise for each bias: ﬁrst, the awareness and the control
conditions were compared, to see whether the awareness training
had any eﬀect; then the analogical condition was compared to the
TABLE 3 | Percentage of correct responses for each bias.
Bias Percentage of correct responses (%)
Anchoring bias 63.96
Framing effect 50.00
Outcome bias 44.48
Base rate neglect 44.00
Sunk cost fallacy 41.56
Overconfidence bias 35.06
Covariation detection 27.27
Regression to the mean 20.78
Insensitivity to sample size 16.23
awareness condition, to determine whether it brought any further
improvement.
Effects for the Separate Biases
The analyses of the individual biases revealed that 4 weeks after
the training, the participants showed improved decision making
only for the composite score of statistical biases (which was
calculated as the sum of the scores of the Insensitivity to sample
size, the Base rate neglect, the Regression to the mean, and the
Covariation detection tasks), χ2(9) = 7.58, p = 0.02. Participants
did not show signiﬁcant improvement for the Framing eﬀect,
χ2(7) = 1.05, p = 0.59, the Anchoring bias, χ2(7) = 0.94,
p = 0.62, the Sunk cost fallacy, χ2(7) = 3.19, p = 0.2, the
Outcome bias, χ2(7) = 2.71, p = 0.26, and the Overconﬁdence
bias, χ2(7) = 2.29, p = 0.32.
In the case of the statistical biases the signiﬁcant 3 × 2
interaction indicates changes in the pattern of the development
through training conditions (from the control to the analogical
condition). This eﬀect is demonstrated on Figure 1 where an
increase can be observed regarding the performance between
pre- and post-training scores of statistical biases. Participants in
the control condition showed the lowest performance, while this
value was the highest for the analogical condition. The results
can be interpreted more easily with Cohen’s d values between
the pre- and the post-training test means in every condition;
the smallest Cohen’s d can be observed in the control group,
while the highest can be observed in the analogical training group
(descriptive statistics and Cohen’s d eﬀect sizes are available in the
Supplementary Material). This trend is reﬂected in the ﬁnding
that only the analogical training group performed signiﬁcantly
better than the control group, b = 0.61, t(151) = −2.75,
p = 0.007, η2 = 0.22. However, the diﬀerence between the two
training groups was not signiﬁcant, b = 0.28, t(151) = 1.25,
p = 0.21, η2 = 0.1. Nevertheless, participants in the awareness
group did not show signiﬁcant performance increase compared
to the control group, b = 0.33, t(151) = −1.48, p = 0.14,
η2 = 0.12.
FIGURE 1 | Performance in the different conditions for the statistical
biases. Means and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for pre- and
post-training tests for each condition are presented.
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Figure 1 illustrates the performance on the diﬀerent
conditions for statistical biases. An increase can be observed
regarding the performance between pre- and post-training
scores of statistical biases; participants in the control condition
had the lowest performance change, while in the analogical
condition an increase in performance can be observed. The
results can be interpreted more easily with Cohen’s d values
between the pre- and the post-training test means in every
condition; the smallest Cohen’s d can be observed in the
control group, while the highest can be observed in the
analogical training group. This trend (the diﬀerence between
Cohen’s d among experimental conditions) represents the
eﬀect of the analogical training (descriptive statistics and
Cohen’s d eﬀect sizes are available in the Supplementary
Material).
In the individual analysis of the statistical biases, we
found that the inclusion of the interactional term signiﬁcantly
improved model ﬁt only for the Insensitivity to sample size,
χ2(7) = 7.3, p = 0.03. More speciﬁcally, here the analogical
training signiﬁcantly diﬀered from the awareness group; b= 2.18,
Z = 2.36, p = 0.02, while the awareness training did not show
any diﬀerence from the control group, b = 0.59, Z = 0.62,
p = 0.54. The performance on the diﬀerent conditions is
illustrated in Figure 2 for the Insensitivity to sample size,
showing a similar trend to the composite of the statistical
biases.
Reported Effect of the Training for Real Life Decisions
At the end of the second questionnaire, participants of the
experimental conditions were asked whether they made any
decisions diﬀerently in their everyday life after the training
using the learned coping strategies. All together 46.15% of the
participants reported ‘yes’ to this question. With respect to the
statistical biases, 58% of the participants who received analogical
training for the statistical biases reported ‘yes’ and only 32.43% of
participants who received only awareness training for these biases
chose the ‘yes’ option.
FIGURE 2 | Performance in the different conditions for Insensitivity to
sample size. Means and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for pre- and
post-training tests for each condition are presented.
Discussion
In this study, we present a training method that attempts to
utilize analogical encoding (Gentner et al., 2004) in order to
explore its potentials for lasting decision making debiasing.
The method was tested in the case of 10 well-known decision
biases and the eﬃciency of the analogical training was compared
to traditional awareness training and a ‘no-training’ control
group. To measure the eﬃciency of the training methods, we
assessed the susceptibility of the participants to the biases after
the training, and to control for cohort-eﬀects we measured the
baseline bias-susceptibility of the participants prior the training.
The results indicated that the improvement achieved by the
training was detectable for certain biases even 4 weeks after
training. We found that a group of biases that we call statistical
biases, especially on the Insensitivity to sample size, beneﬁted the
most from our training. Yet, for the other biases, we could not
detect improvement after either the awareness, or the analogical
training.
It is not surprising that the debiasing of the statistical
biases beneﬁtted the most from the analogical training since
the main advantage of building on analogical processing is
that it can decrease the diﬃculty that people encounter when
they try to encode or apply abstract rules (such as statistical
principles). Transfer of trained statistical principles have shown
success previously with non-bias tasks (Nisbett et al., 1983; Fong
and Nisbett, 1991), and training especially increased everyday
inductive reasoning when it was built on people’s intuitive
statistical knowledge (Nisbett et al., 1983). Various empirical
studies suggest, however, that abstract rules are more eﬀectively
trained when they are presented in more intuitive representations
(such as frequencies instead of probabilities, e.g., Gigerenzer and
Hoﬀrage, 1995); pictorial displays instead of mere text (Galesic
et al., 2009); or pragmatic rules instead of pure syntactic rules
(Cheng et al., 1986).
Our results also resonate with the suggestion of De Neys
and Bonnefon (2013) that thinking biases can occur at diﬀerent
points in the reasoning process. According to their account,
a bias can be the result of storage failure, monitoring failure
or inhibition failure. The authors argue that most biases in
reasoning can be connected to inhibition failure, a later stage of
the reasoning process. The framework of Stanovich and West
(2008) is more speciﬁc about the diﬀerent paths that can lead
decision makers to follow a heuristic response instead of the
normative response. Here, the ﬁrst question again is if the
procedures and declarative knowledge (mindware) are available
during the process to override the heuristic answer. Failures due
to inhibition would come only at a later stage of the process.
Based on these accounts, it is possible that the biases relying
on statistical principles represent more storage or mindware
problems compared to the other biases we measured. In this
sense, the analogical training method should be used speciﬁcally
in cases of mindware problems.
It was, however, surprising to ﬁnd that 4 weeks after the
intervention only limited improvement is sustained from an
intensive debiasing training. Most previous debiasing studies
measured the degree of improvement in the same session with
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the intervention (e.g., Larrick et al., 1990; Clarkson et al., 2002;
Cheng and Wu, 2010), rarely exploring whether the training
achieved an enduring change in the decision maker’s behavior
(Fong and Nisbett, 1991). It may be useful if further research of
debiasing methods would not be limited to the detection of the
immediate debiasing eﬀects, but would more thoroughly explore
the endurance of the acquired skills as well. To measure the
real-life changes the training achieved, we used a single question
assessment. However, to assess the improvement of people’s real-
world decision making competence a more thorough test would
be necessary. The Decision Outcome Inventory (Parker and
Fischhoﬀ, 2005), for example, has been developed to survey real-
world decision outcomes which has been found to correlate with
tests of decision making competence (Bruine de Bruin et al.,
2007; Parker et al., 2015). Although the test typically explores
people’s decision outcomes for the previous 10-years frame, it
would be practical to devise a version of the test for a much
shorter time-frame for assessing the endurance of the acquired
skills of decision competence.
While our empirical results require further validation, the
main contribution of this paper is the new debiasing method and
the training assessment technique it provides. The development
of an analogical training method for a greater variety of
decision biases shed light on several questions that might desire
more attention in the debiasing approach. As discussed in
the Introduction, debiasing decision making became a vexing
question as simply explaining the existence of biases or providing
coping strategies do not seem to signiﬁcantly improve the quality
of decisions beyond the narrow focus of the training or the
training situation. One reason for this diﬃculty may be that
people show resistance to being debiased (Arkes, 2003), as they
prefer to believe that the decisions they make are generally good
and beneﬁcial. This self-image is supported by the well-known
self-serving attribution and selective autobiographical processes
(Mezulis et al., 2004). On the other hand, when compliance
with the rules is induced by reward people may show better
performance in the testing situation, but without internalization
and voluntary adoption the intended change will not become the
behavioral repertoire of the person (Kaplan et al., 2001). From
this aspect, it seems that prior debiasing training might have
missed putting suﬃcient focus on what Lewin (1947) called the
Unfreezing stage of change. This ﬁrst step of inﬂuencing people to
change involves methods to make them understand that change
is necessary. In developing our training, we tried to give special
emphasis to this phase and made sure that the participants gain
experience about how much their judgment can go wrong and
to realize how much they could improve the quality of their
decisions. Eliciting motivation to change in the participants is
especially crucial as recent reviews suggest that the introduction
of the various decision aids to organizations results in limited
change (McLean and Antony, 2014).
Lewin’s (1947) second stage, Change, was themain focus of the
development of this debiasing method. To facilitate the process
of change, we chose to make the participants work in groups
during the training as individuals are more likely to be inﬂuenced
by the behavior of their peers and change in this setting
(Greenbank and Hepworth, 2008). Considering the method of
the training, we argued that to achieve eﬀective behavior change,
the decision maker has to be able to recognize those situations
and environmental patterns where they have to try to avoid the
traps of decision biases. To foster the recognition of structural
similarities between superﬁcially diﬀerent cases of the same bias,
the analogical encoding method (Gentner et al., 2004) seems to
be the most promising technique. Among the many advantages of
this method, it can be used to help decision makers integrate the
learned coping techniques into their everyday life by connecting
them to their facilitated autobiographical memories (Gentner
et al., 2009). In Lewin’s (1947) terminology, the role of this
Refreezing stage is to sustain and stabilize the changes that have
beenmade. In our study, we only retested the participants 4 weeks
after the training, as our primary interest was to see which of the
trained skills resisted attenuation.
This analogical transfer method has interesting resemblance to
the case-based reasoning (CBR) approach (Richter and Aamodt,
2005). CBR is based on human problem solving research (Schank,
1983), but mostly applied in artiﬁcial intelligence solutions
(Watson, 1998). The idea behind the approach is that the human
mind is more prone to capture knowledge through speciﬁc
experiences than via learning abstract rules (Schank, 1999). At
problem solving, we rarely recall abstract rules. Rather we try
to retrieve the most analogous case we solved before and we
adapt those methods to our present case (Lopez De Mantaras
et al., 2005). The model of CBR has inspired not just computer-
based systems, but also education techniques (Kolodner et al.,
2005). These techniques aim to build on analogical reasoning
processes in the encoding, retrieval, and adaptation of new
information (Kolodner, 1997). It seems that in the context of
solving real-world problems, case-based learning ismore eﬀective
than simple presentation of abstract rules (Kolodner et al., 2003),
while abstract principles can be better taught through cases.
Jacobson et al. (2012), for example, showed that decision making
competence was improved along with academic learning when
decision training was integrated in history courses. It is possible
that memorable cases of critical decisions helped the student –
via analogical encoding – identify situations in which to apply
the acquired knowledge. These emerging techniques allow us to
take more advantage of the analogical techniques when abstract
principles are to be educated in decision debiasing.
Since this analogical debiasing training has been only
tangentially studied in relation to the main decision biases and
fallacies, we included a wider range of them in this study.
Investigating debiasing techniques for multiple biases has the
advantage that the corrective eﬀect of the techniques can be
compared among the biases and it can lead to the identiﬁcation
of which techniques should be used for the diﬀerent biases. This
assessment method requires that in a multiple choice test the
chance level of correct responses are equal for each bias. To
satisfy this methodological need we had to use a bias-test where
the response mode is the same for all tasks. In our tests, the
participants had to choose between four options where only one
option was considered the correct response and choosing any of
the other three options indicated susceptibility to the speciﬁc bias.
A further novelty of our analysis was that we controlled for
the baseline diﬀerences between the experimental and control
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groups. Although our participants had been randomly allocated
to one of the three groups, individual diﬀerences independent
of our manipulation can bring noise to the analysis. To avoid
this, we introduced a baseline test prior to the training, by which
we could concentrate our analysis to the improvement that the
intervention achieved from pre-test to post-test.
Limitations
This study is an early step in discovering the possible advantages
of the analogical encoding method for decision debiasing and
as such, it comes with limitations where conclusions are drawn.
As in the case of any interactive intervention, the experimental
variables cannot be entirely controlled due to the practical
nature of the training. Consequently, alternative explanations of
the eﬀect cannot be completely excluded. Although our results
suggest that the analogical training is eﬀective on statistical biases,
and when compared to the awareness training almost twice as
many participants reported that they tried to apply the learned
coping strategies in their everyday life between the training and
the second test, this eﬀect is not necessarily the result of the
technique itself. The analogical training took somewhat more
time than the awareness training, so it is not impossible that
spending more time with one bias resulted in more sustainable
knowledge of it. In the same vein, it cannot be concluded from
the data how much the interactivity and not the analogical nature
of the training is responsible for the debiasing eﬀect. Within the
analogical training, it would be interesting to know whether the
improvement was due to the recognition of structural or the
surface similarities between the training and the test examples. It
is possible that training on certain biases had a carry-over eﬀect
to the training of other biases. Similarly, it is also possible that the
trainings had a more general corrective eﬀect on the participants’
decision making than we managed to measure, but that it faded
away by the time of our test 4 weeks after the training. People’s
susceptibility to the individual biases may be better measured by
including more items in the questionnaire and by using more
sophisticated questionnaires for the assessment of the changes
the training achieves in their life. Further research is needed
to explore the potentials of the analogical encoding method for
decision debiasing and identify the mediating mechanisms and
moderating factors.
Conclusion
Although the results of the analogical reasoning research
were taken as a “tremendous promise” (Bazerman, 2005) for
improving decision making, the eﬃciency of themethod has been
tested almost only on negotiation strategy training. Nevertheless,
this technique, which assists the decision makers to learn
and apply abstract principles in structurally similar situations,
provides a complementing response to several shortcomings
of the commonly used debiasing techniques. This initiative
oﬀers some methodological support for a systematic research
that can hopefully provide enduring techniques for improving
decision making, a chief limitation of the ﬁeld of behavioral
research.
Further Thoughts
To amend the present hiatus of the debiasing approach of
decision science, we believe that a systematic research program
should explore the necessary components of those training
methods that can achieve long-lasting improvement in decision
skills related to a wider array of cognitive biases. Such a program
should study the eﬃciency of both general and speciﬁc debiasing
techniques. General skills such as critical thinking, need for
cognition, analogical thinking, pattern recognition or statistical
knowledge have been shown to increase the immunity for bias
susceptibility. How to achieve lasting improvement in these
skills related to real-life problem solving is a necessary question
to answer. Regarding bias-speciﬁc debiasing techniques, the
challenge is to implement the laboratory ﬁndings into practical
and testable training solutions. To answer this question, we
could beneﬁt from a general overview of the evidence for
successful debiasing regarding speciﬁc biases. The determinants
of ‘refreezing’ is also an open question for further research. To
explore this question, attempts similar to our present work are
needed in order to develop a methodology for measuring the
eﬃciency and duration of the applied debiasing techniques.
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